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I. The genesis of the law of international economic relations and its 
relation to private international law and other branches of law. II. The new 
response: The ’law of internat ional economic relations' — its notional scope 
and the principal elements of the content of its subject-matter.
1. THE GENESIS OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS AND ITS RELATION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND OTHER BRANCHES OF LAW
1. The revolt of the facts against the traditional order of the system in law
2. The jurisprudential concept of the revolt: The unsatisfactory metamorphosis 
of pri vate international law -  The birth of new systems. 3. General experiences 
resulting from the revolt as viewed by jurisprudence. 4. The facts in Hungary 
and the response of Hungarian jurisprudence to them. 5. The search for a new 
response and the earlier systems.
1. The revolt of the facts against the traditional order of the system
in law
In the multitude of the legal issues of the international economic re­
lations so far jurisprudence has failed to build up a clear-cut system that 
would well correspond to the by themselves lucid words, e. g. to such words 
as what does private international law conceal today and what can it ‘bear’; 
whether there is an international economic law and, if there is one, what 
would it consist of, or whether there is a “law of international economic 
relations , i. e. the eponym of the title. This article (or more thoroughly 
the larger writ ing underlying it -  Modi) attempts to provide a summariz­
ing suivey of the developments. I t is meant to be a venture to present a 
somewhat clearer picture, and to outline, wit hin it, the main features of the 
“law of international economic relations”.
One of the principal causes of the want of clarity in this field is the ‘re­
volt of the facts againts the law” as many describe the actual situation, or 
‘the explosion in private international law‘ as others would have it.
Notwithstanding its many major or minor intrinsic contradictions 
(that it is not only private law. hut something extending also to other 
branches of the law; that it is not only, moreover not in the f :rst place, 
international; that the erosion of substantive law caused by new winds 
slowly eats away the surface of conflicts law, etc.) private international 
law lias for many decades, moreover centuries, provided a peaceful and sa­
tisfactory framework for international personal relations and material 
commercial transactions. Thé cause why facts revolted and a colossal ex­
plosion came about lay in the circumstance that private international law 
or conflicts law not only defended tlvs traditional position of the late 20th 
century, that in Hungary it could not step out of it even today, but that 
many thought to bring even the new facts under the cover of tins traditio­
nal category. The in the beginning humble revolt began when from the 
end of the past century onwards roughly till the middle of te present 
century when in some of the domains of international personal relations 
and material commercial transactions, the unification of substantive law 
began to take place (international conventions, usages and practices of a 
trend in this sense, rozuhly in the image of what may be called lex me.r- 
calorin or the new law merchant). Traditional thinking o{ private inter­
national law (textbooks, monographs,periodical literature)tried to squeeze 
this body of law into its own framework, although it was fully aware of 
that this was not anymore private international law. It was, namely, 
never argued that the désignât ion of private international law stood unam­
biguously for a uniform concept: it was the connotation of conflicts law.
Yet further facts of a major order have come, and their yet greater 
revolt, in particular in the second half of the present century. Of these 
the more essential ones are (the sequence does not represent a scale of 
value): the strong interventionism of the. state even under capitalist condit­
ions in international relations, in particular in the foreign trade relations 
and their law: owing to the strong internationalization of the economic 
(technological, productive, investment, commercial) processes by the side 
of the growth of the traditional exchange of goods, forms of cooperation, 
large and longterm international investments, technological-developmental 
and payment transactions, commission work. etc. have begun to turn up 
with great weight. In the domain of industrial property not only the purc­
hase of patents has become a characteristic trait, but also the transfer of 
scientific-technical development (inventions, ‘know-how', etc.) by way of par­
ticipation in the construction of manufacturing plants operating at this hig­
her technological level. Other facts are the private and state organization of 
economic competition and the world market; the appearance of the complex 
systems of economic integrations, the foreign trade monopoly of the state 
and its planning in the socialist countries; t he special interests of the devel­
oping countries (the third world) and their dramatic manifestation in the 
world economic processes (only remember the struggles that took place in 
UNCTAD and the oil crisis); the endeavours of the states to facilitate and 
advance international economic relations among others for the reinforce­
ment of peace and security (Helsinki resolutions; the position taken by
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the United Nations Organization on the new international economic order 
and the principles of interstate economic coopérât ion; the European Econom­
ic Commission; UNCITRAL; GATT). Private international law was im­
potent against these phenomena, this revolt of facts. These phenomena 
turned up in a colossal amount of norms of a so diverse nature that private 
international law was at a loss what to begin with them. To serve or to 
develop them, what would in fact be the function of suitable channels 
of the law, it was wholly incapable.
1 he fiist phase of the revolt, and its result apparent 1 v of universal 
nature, was the supersession of the traditional order by an orderlessness 
gradually gaining predominance. The borderlines of private international 
law ils a discipline were simply ignored, the dissolution of the traditional 
notional categories and criteria have become more and more visible, where­
as those ahering to the traditional order have found themselves in the ne­
gative situation of inertia. St ill at many | »laces for a long time also the tradi­
tional branches of the law (civil law, commercial law, international law, 
administrative law) have sliped into the role of inertia, when they haven 
tried to approach the new phenomena from the side of traditional catego­
ries. The other side of the same thing is that these traditional branches and 
disciplines have tried to get hold of the body of law of the revolting facts 
•and phenomena exclusively in either this or the other traditional frame­
work only to become, owing to their inept domination, the traget of the 
revolt.
The second phase of the revolt (while the timing is oriented to the con­
tent rather than to the temporal sequence of the phases) consists in the 
efforts to find a new order to replace the anarchy. Efforts are made to in­
terpret scientifically and systematize the new facts and phenomena by 
having ıeeourse to new theories, new concepts and bv outlining new dis­
ciplines.
2. The jurisprudential concept of the revolt: The unsatisfactory meta- 
moi phosis of private international law* — The birth of new svstems
In what do these new tendencies, theories and disciplines in realitv 
consist ?
I>et us begin our survey in the capitalist world, and even there concern- 
ing the world of Common Law. If pragmatism is characteristic of the one or 
the other nook of the world of legal thinking, so Anglo-Saxon and mainly 
American pragmatism may serve as examples. Seemingly this pragmatism 
has been easily through with the revolt of the facts: it has smashed the iner­
tia of the traditional disciplines almost at a single stroke.
Common Law pragmatism tries to evade theoretical notions or con­
cepts. in this occassionally it goes fairly far also as regards the law and 
institutions of the international economic relations. E. g. authors write 
of multi-national concerns, domestic and international state enterprises, 
still when it comes to speak of notions, of the background or social content, 
then we may read words like that there are no notions and that it is mean-
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ingless to be looking for them because one would anyway be put hard to it 
when it came to sum them up under uniform notional criteria. Still when 
we see one (viz. an international state enterprise) then we should be able 
to recognize it (Garner). After this minimizing of the notions and the se­
arch for the social background they rather seriously write e.g. of the inter­
national or multi-national enterprise. They offer a complete arsenal of the 
means law can afford, all that those at the given place w'ould have to know 
for a success at the given time. Naturally even such a pragmatist literature 
falls out of its part: first, from time to time it indulges in criticisms, second­
ly, it lets the cat out of the bag on speaking of the deeper background. 
This is the case when pragmatist literature ventures on the embellishment 
of the negative picture of the multi-national concerns (Mauser), or in the 
same connexion qualifies national sovereighty as a watchword which had 
its time, “but ultimately mankind will not be able ta  evade the choice be­
tween the destructive divisiveness of a growing number of national sovere­
ignties, and the abandonment of outworn legal and political structures for 
the sake of the universal concerns which, in an increasingly overpopulated, 
polluted and dangerous world, demand the drastic curtailment of national 
sovereignty for the sake of common surrival” ( Friedmann).
Now when we are looking for a scientific, or at least a textbook-like, 
systematization, then examples will be found for the latter at most, rather 
than others cousciously well-reflected upon. As regards systematizations 
of this kind two statements suggest themselves. First, the coherence of the 
scope delimited by the works given here is either not even explained by 
the authors, or they will on methodological considerations refer to the one 
or the other pragmatic cause (the topic is of importance, all that has to be 
known in the given field, the subject-matter belongs to it because it be­
longs to it). Secondly, within the material discussed some sort of a complex 
functionalism dominates as principal consideration, that namely with the 
multiplicity of the legal means we have to serve the ‘social decision-making', 
the proper operation of foreign trade, and, to this end, the full complexity 
of the legal means is needed.
Under the heading “The Law and Practice of International Trade’' 
Schmitthoff promises a solid, coherent picture of this law, still without any 
notional or taxonomical principles of distinctions he simple proposes the 
response of English law to the following principal questions: the subjects 
of foreign trade, the types of contract and usages of foreign trade; the rele­
vant parts of conflicts law; the function of governmental agencies promot­
ing foreign trade; enterprises, their inner-outer movements and their form; 
financing of foreign trade and the law of foreign exchange; credits and in­
surance; industrial property in international economic relations; the system 
of state licences in exports and imports; state control; customs and taxes 
in foreign trade relations; disputes and arbitration.
I t  is more than interesting that in this work there are not even traces 
of the concept Schmitthoff was working on earlier, the concept namely to 
which the name of the new law merchant of world trade, the new lex merca- 
toria has been given, and where there is quite a weight of systematizing
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consistency. The essence may be summed up as follows: (a) The world 
economy of the international economic processes outgrowing mere barter 
trade outgrows the municipal commercial law. (b) For the multiplicity of 
international commercial transactions more and more a nonimunicipal 
body of law born in international legislation (convections), usages and legal 
practice will be normative, (c) The autonomous power of these is increased 
by harmonizing international arbitration; and, (d) by the legal science ac­
tivity in comparative law. Schmitthoff sees many of the difficulties of this 
new system understood in a sectoral or system-creating meaning. E. g. 
that this body of law is being applied mostly by municipal forums. Conse­
quently it tends to become disintegrated to an extent that relief can be 
brought only by some sort of uniform world-wire arbitration. He does 
not mention, however, that this system is apt to burst the legal evelope of 
municipal and non-municipal origin of the same international economic 
processes. There is merely reference ot, for that matter hard to grasp, how 
the traditional private international law will, once come to be extended to 
the body of substantive law, become related to the branch of world trade 
law. He fails to speak of, and simply ignores the entire body of law ruling 
international trade with institutions other than such of civil law. On the 
other the body of international commercial law of the socialist countries, 
e. g. the CMEA General Conditions of Delivery of Goods seems to be part 
and parcel of Il s  conception. Hence all that appears to us in the guise of 
the autonomous law of worldtrade, viz. all rules or provisions of internation­
al economic relations of the nature of civil (commercial) law, civil proce­
dural law and private international law of non-municipal origin, has as 
regards its own arrangement three nodal points, viz. the juristic person or 
legal entity (the subjects-at-law), the contract and, finally, arbitration. 
In a lecture delivered by the French R. David jointly with the Rumanian 
T. Papescu to the 1976 Rome congress of UNIDROIT modern lex mer- 
caloria got a new impetus and with it literature received renewed incent­
ives. The principal issues were on the whole the same, enriched by a new 
element. In the Congress namely also elements of public law came to a tt­
ract interest , however, the system-building synthetization of the two spher­
es still remains to be tackled.
The American Fulda and Schwartz begin their textbook “Regulation 
of International Trade and Investment” with the remark that they convey 
an idea of the fundamental questions of the law of foreign trade-in a sys­
tematic consideration. Eventually it stands out clearly that in the thorough 
and complex discussion of the several institutions of law they are concern­
ed with two things only, first, with the free movement of goods and in­
vestments, and, secondly, with the state (or international) promotion or 
limitation as the case may be of this. If in the background of their quasi­
textbook we were looking for the common denominator giving shape to 
the subject-matter of the work, which as intended by its authors provides 
a rather good pragmatic legal instrumentation, then we could discover this 
common denominator nowhere else but in the expansion-orientedness of 
American economy.
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Tn the textbook “Law and Institutions in the Atlantic Area” by the 
in like way American Strin and Hay in the Contemporary Legal Education 
Series an idea is conveyed of the law of international economic relations 
of the what are called Atlantic countries in its almost full complexity. 
As regards their system, as indicated earlier, methodologically they follow 
the modern version of functionalism, i.e. they contemplate law from the 
outlook of political theory, i.e. within the sphereof definite issues they give 
attention to all means of the law by the application of which social decision­
making may be turned to an optimum for the proper functioning of the 
given institut ions, and by this they help the given social system (to) achieve 
its value targets. This is plain speech at least as far as the general social 
functions of this S ]iliere of the law are concerned, still the failure to re­
cognize the differentiated nature of the branches of law, its disregard or 
tacit denial would not necessarily follow from this outlook of the authors, 
although an explanations of the complexity of functionalism.
We could go on with this survey and the we should again meet the 
above bodies of law, or part of them, under the headings ‘the law of in­
ternational economic organizations’, ‘Community law’ (this name has been 
given to the law of the European Economic Communities), ‘international 
commercial law’, while innumerous headings like ‘international law of 
transport’, international cartel law’, ‘the law of international financial 
transactions’, etc. would also turn up. Here there could hardly be talk of 
systematization, either as regards the affiliation of the body of law com­
prised, or the outline of a methodological symbiosis of the legal norms of 
a multiplicity of nature discussed jointly with the above.
From these facts the following principla statements may be drawn: 
In the Common Law countries the revolt of the facts announcing the advent 
of a new age of international economic relations has passed off not within 
the framework and under the heading of private international law, but 
wholly outside it. Meanwhile private international law has remained 
what it traditionally was, namely conflicts law. All that may be talk of is 
at most that occasionally the particular ‘systems’ also embrace the con­
flicts law side of the things, i.e. certain institutions of conflicts law pass 
through certain modifications, and remain such of conflicts law, yet with 
a different content. The facts in revolt receive a new legal ‘system’ or 
framework, in teaching as well as in legal writing, municipal and interna­
tional legislation and legal practice, in this field from pragmatic teleology 
and economic-political functionalism.
It is not as if Common Law jurisprudence did not know what the 
norms of administrative, criminal, civil, public and private international 
law are intended for or in what they consist. Only if in certain cases in 
legal science they go as far as the general methodological investigation of 
the norms (they rather take the norms as given), as to the building of 
theoretical systems in the branches of law hardly any interest emerges or 
developes. If they nevertheless develop systems (e.g. in the form of the 
organisation of a textbook), in them the theoretical segregation or inter­
dependence of the different branches of law will have hardly any role.
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This is t he case formally simply because, as in his manual Les grands 
systèmes de droit contemporains R. David describes Common Law. European 
thinking in systems of branches of law, systematization according to the 
theoretical classifications of public law — private law, civil law -  com­
mercial law, etc. are alien to Common Law jurists.
It appears therefore as if owing to the revolt of facts as regards system 
and systematization we stood before the great Nihil. This is. however, an 
exaggregation and a criticism not addressed to the essence. This “system” 
is in its scientific unmethodicalness and pragmatism very viable. The 
jurists’ society of the jurists’ law operates tins huge legal machinery 
with skill and in an extremely variable manner. There is in the system the 
knowledge of the very cultivated guildmasters of the use of the tools, and 
in greater cases also the skill of a conductor, the skill namely required for 
— the concentrated introduction of a multiplicity of means, moreover, 
the value -  oriented understanding of the functionalism of political theory 
we have spoken of above. 1 he totality of rules and knowledge sees the 
wood also and not only the trees, in particular when by the wood we 
understand the protection of the underlying social-economic svstem. 
The Common Law jurists rather omit looking at the wood in order to keep 
silent on that here is the case of the defence of the capitalist society and 
e(onomv, the rule of capital, the state monopolv capitalism. Common 
Law with its inherent case-law approach plays into the hands of this, 
in particular when the case is one of questions of detail, which by the wav 
constitute the majority. Common Law with its variable, adaptable func­
tionalist pragmatism not tied by taxonomical considerations serves well 
the movement and orientation of American economy. This is betrayed 
also by the latest development of American law in tlie international eco­
nomic relations and its in the European meaning of the term system­
less discipline: there was no system of branches of law which the revolt of 
facts should have subverted, nor has come such a system into being. 
If Common Law has as to its essential elements changed for reasons innate 
in the economic conditions of capitalism of the age, the change is the gather­
ing strength of statute law by the side of judge-made law (strictly speak­
ing the marriage of the two in the modern’ sense, where the one party is 
more understanding, the other more tolerant) yet not the abandonment 
of the reluctance to the formation of theoretical systems. This is the case 
also when in certain unambiguously homogeneous fields a large-scale 
development of statute law has set in. e.g. in sales in Britain, or the codi­
fication of commercial law in the United States of America, as objective 
manifestations of the intrinsic pressure for systematization. Ths legislation 
has not come to be extended beyond the confines to the given part domains 
and there are not even indications of the whole ‘system’s falling into a 
systematizing euphoria.
Europe, on the other hand, has through the centuries of her history 
passed the school of legal systematization. When did she start to reach 
the present stage ( In the Roman law of Justinian built on a comprehensive 
system, i.e. in his Corpus Iuris Civilis, there ware alreadv the principles
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and systems, a way of thinking emanating from Aristotelian Greek phi­
losophy as absorbed by the Christian forms of thought shaping the mind 
of the Justinian epoch. This attitude then at a relatively early date met 
with one of the essences of the centralized political forms of authoritarian­
ism, or more concretely, of the empires, only to buttress up their political 
and social system with large systems of legislation. Historically this might 
have been random-like, for it was not this that was the end of the trend of 
thought of non-Roman origin. The system then grew in strengt h, moreover, 
the great men of the national states saw in the large ‘codes’ their mainstay 
and the means of the survival of their memory. Napoleon e.g. said, as 
inscribed on one of the bas-reliefs surrounding his red marble sarcophagus, 
that it was not his many battles of which he was proudest, but his Code 
civil which would never be forgotten. We may go on with the enumeration 
of examples illustrating this outlook. On the other hand thinking in terms 
of comprehensive systems and codifications according to coherent prin­
ciples has become part and parcel of European legal thinking to an extent 
that not even socialist Europe could bring about changes in it. This out­
look bas been thrust in this direction also by the circumstance that social 
planning of a comprehensive nature, conscious economic organization of 
necessity insists on legislation appearing in coherent systems.
The first flaw in tins fine order of clear-cut and delimited branches of 
law was the product of state intervention in economy appearing in the late 
phase of monopoly capitalism (mainly internally, by constructing economic 
law, or other specialized mixed branches of law, yet by protecting the 
system as a whole). After the Second World War, however, a serious earth­
quake shook the system to its fundations. This manifested itself partly 
in the revolt of the facts growing in intensity against the traditional sub­
systems (branches and disciplines) and partly in the influence of American 
pragmatism.
What is the result? Private international law was for a time still 
predominant: it could absorb certain effects, still thereafter as a relatively 
well closing system it withdrew from the scene. Its role has been taken 
over by the pragmatic systems. In these systems pragmatism is (for the 
scope and the functional complexity of the institutions discussed here) 
substantially the same as in America. Still in these systems there is system 
not only in parantheses, but system as virtually existing as the element 
of European legal thinking, yet truly in two respects only. First, that where 
it is possible one strives for comprehensive systems as meant by the specific 
branches of law. Secondly, in the sense that even where a ‘system’ (text­
book, in the scope of law comprised by the discipline) can not demonstrate 
a theoretically well coherent system, moreover, where it is aware of mov­
ing in a sectoral mixtum compositum there it will still operate with theoretic­
al categories of the system-building traditions. Tins manifests itself in 
the circumstance that the system in this sense theoretically registers the 
sectoral nature of the legal institutions discussed and so applies them; 
that in general it reverts, and where possible feeds back, to the parent 
system of the given institutions of law.
454 F. m Ad l
As regards sucli systems brought about in the world of the law of 
international economic relations more explicitly, the designations (text­
books, institutes, periodicals, forums, governmental agencies and such 
of integration) are of a multiple kind: ‘international economic law’, ‘the 
law of world trade’, ‘international commercial law’, ‘the law of international 
trade’, and as regards the economic integrations ‘European commercial 
law’, ‘European economic law’, and ‘the law of the European Communi­
ties’, are the best known and most current of all. Not only the names, 
but also the systems indicated by them, differ from one another prag­
matically.
Batiffol this authority of private international law in the traditional 
meaning of the term, with profound judgement writes in the preface of the 
work of Loussouam and Bredin, Droit du commerce international, that the 
originality of the title of the work also expresses a new content. On the 
one side present day international economic relations are interrelated with 
the substantive regulation of the domestic relations of economy, and.
1 on the other, the huge fabric of state interventionism prevailing also in 
this domain, and the enormous complex of municipal and international 
civil and public law norms have grown to an extent that the authors 
hardly had another choice than to ‘respond in a novel manner to this si­
tuation. and to demonstrate the law of international trade in its own 
development, and not in the congeries of appendices to the particular 
chapters of private international law’. When viewed from the aspect of 
the taxonomic disintegration this latter sentence appropriately presents 
the new situation: the traditional system of private international law 
has for some time tried to put up with the new facts and cope with them. 
Eventually, however, the caul of the appendices standing for a temporary 
solution has ripped and the newborn babe has also grown up, with all the 
traits, the mixture of the various branches of private and public interna­
tional law, which were already present in the caul of the appendices of 
private international law. Here constitutional law, administrative law, 
commercial law, civil law, public international law, law of procedure, 
and (now as the reverse of the former situation), for certain institutions, 
the body of private international law, are all assembled. I t is character­
istic almost of the totality of completeness or complexity that in the large 
system of more than thousand pages the corresponding sections of the 
body of law of the European Economic Community and also the General 
Conditions of Delivery of Goods of the CMEA have been taken up. All 
this has been done in a way that the structure of the textbook almost 
faithfully follows the system of French municipal commercial law. It is only 
in the particular institutions that the entire world trade has come to be 
embraced, with almost its entire body of sources, for that matter in a 
comprehensive complexity with the participation of the branches of law 
as required by ends followed in this way of functionalism. The authors, 
to be sure, do not say that their work is a theoretically closed system, still 
less that it were an autonomous uniform branch of law.
Goldman's Droit commercial européen relates only to the relatively auto-
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nomous and novel system of norms of the Common Market, to so-called 
European law. He lays it down as a fact that in this totality of rules almost 
all branches of law are assembled. He lays it down asa fact thet in this total­
ity of rules almost all branches of law are assembled. He discusses the usual 
problems of commercial law and of other branches of law of all institutions 
concerned. The stress has, however, been laid on the external system of 
conditions (of public international law, constitutional law. administrative 
law. fiscal law and conflicts law) of operation of the particular institutions, 
e. g. enterprises.
Whereas Goldman in this textbook keeps aloof of theory, the so far 
most comprehensive and scientifically largest undertaking ipsen's Europäi­
sches Gemeinschaftsvech 1 tries to cope theoretically also with what he has 
created: with the conglomerate system of the complexity of norms giving 
expression to the Western European capitalist economic integration. The 
term itself, viz. conglomerate system is fraught with contradictions. This 
has not been altered even by the itself fascinating undertaking of ipsen, 
this late descendant of the German creators of theories and systems, to 
grasp and present this system or to transform the revolt of the facts into an 
operating power system. In the background of the running condition of the 
conglomerate system and. indirectly, the system of the work finally there 
stands both the general and special factor which has created the Common 
Market and keeps it in a running order, while among the special factors a 
special position has been occupied by the large legal machinery and the 
army of jurists, which has acquired a knowledge of the system fed by ele­
ments of constitutional law and public international law through administ­
rative elements to labour law and .civil law by almost all branches of law, 
and effectively serves it.
As regards theoretical systematization the principal thesis of ipsen is 
that in this community law we have an autonomous field of law in itself 
closed and coherent. The reason, criterion of independence and coherence 
and the novelty of tins phenomenon is a reflection of the European Eco­
nomic Community, namely that this is a new, autonomous and in itself 
coherent organizational and legal form which quantitatively and qualitativ­
ely may modify the economic functions of the member states. This will 
hold also with respect to public international law and constitutional law, 
inasmuch as regards the origin and basis of validity the total corpus of law 
is a specific one (the totality of specific treaties and legal norms created at 
community level, which are directly effective in the activities of the law- 
enforcing agencies of both the municipal and community level). r.Lhe coer­
cive element of independence and internal coherence and consequently the 
decisive core determining the proper notion of community law is eventual­
ly the organization itself, i.e. with the Community we have an internation­
ally (regionally) organized economy. By this ipsen already transgresses 
the scope of autonomy and internal coherence and enlarges upon the exeges­
is of the legal-branch-nature of the so-called community law. Organization 
namely is a broad, complex category, with respect to the branch of law it is 
strictly speaking a common denominator, which lends itself only for the de-
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scription of the field of law or the complex legal system, or at most for out­
lining these. Since organization is by itself almost boundless, it will be com­
pelled to have recourse to a further delimiting category. And this cogent 
category is economic law, or rather the criteria underlying it, namely that 
under modern conditions the state massively interferes in the development 
of the relations of the subjects at law (in general of the market). Organiza­
tion can turn this interventionism into a reality only by an intensive com­
bination of the means of public and private law, or as abstractly stated, 
by the coexistence of the two elements. The final product will willyillv be à 
new phenomenon, an active combination namely as preconditioned by 
the cooperation of the component elements, for which history could not 
say any better or invent for it a better name than economic law. Now in 
community law, whose independence to the outer world, i. e. external in­
dependence in the meaning of what has already been said, the internal 
nature would be provided by the appearance of economic law at community 
level. The appearance of economic law provides one of the internal taxonom­
ic essences, tins expresses the background economic-social content, and 
this has the consequential external delimitation by that prompts economic 
law to claim from the realm of private law or commercial law exactly the 
portion overshadowed by state and Community intervention. Thus Com­
munity law is but a further process of the nutation of economic law, na­
mely the metamorphosis of economic law to Community law. In this new 
process it is a speciality of the mutation that in it the subject of the norms 
of economic 1 aw is though economy, still the norms grow even bevond it. 
The organizational and acting structure (e. g. legislation) of the European 
Economic Community is namely of a weight that Community law defies 
structuralization only from the substantive side as affected bv state inter­
vention. Here also the organizational mechanism will have to be drawn into 
the orbit, for without this specific organization of transmission state inter­
vention can hardly be imagined. The active interplay of these two planes, 
viz. the European organization of intervention and the substantive law 
infiltrated by it provides and interprets economic law transmuted to the 
level of integrat ion: namely the Law of the European Community.
After what has been said there is not much left over for a summary. 
The revolt of facts has in the law of the international economic relations of 
the capitalist countries thrust private international law as a system to the 
roadside, and absorbed in itself its elements needed for the economic rela­
tions whenever this was necessary. The theoretical confines of the branches 
of law have melted away, the systems in statu nascendi develop dependent 
on the functions and the pragmatic objectives, and eventually on the sym­
biosis of the capitalist state and the capitalist economic interests, or go on 
to differenciate (e. g. into Community fiscal law, Community law of compe­
tition, etc. in the European Community law). The theoretical foundations 
of the criteria and systems are either something secondary or the theore­
tical interpretation of the dependence ut supra fed back also'tot lie tradition­
al theoretical categories, an interpretation namely seldom of the critical 
kind, mostly as a response of active reaction.
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The facts which have mutatis mutandis broken out in a revolt even in 
the socialist countries, and are still revolting, against private international, 
we have already seen. What has this revolt become in the jurisprudence of 
the socialist countries ? To have an idea of this four general statements 
have to be premised of the idea of socialist legal literature and the theory- 
orientedness of socialist systematization.
Tirst, socialist legal literature was neither in reality nor in tis manifest­
ation pragmatic in the same measure as the jurisprudence of the capitalist 
world. The taxonomic re-formulations enforced by the revolt of the facts 
have made their appearance in theoretical verification at all times, with the 
continuation of the criteria of the classical branches of law, the develop­
ment of new criteria and the construct ion of concepts of the theory of scien­
ce. I t is a great asset of theoretical systematization that it has a decided 
effect also on practice.
Secondly, theoretical systematization is often superabundant. I t ties 
down a surplus of energy and tends to become an inertial burden.
The third statement is a corollary partly of the former. Namely by the 
side of theoretical-systematizing works there is an out of proportions small 
number of manual, periodicals or monographs dealing with the many con­
crete legal institutions of international economic relations, or helping the 
given conditions of life to live and develop scientifically and in a for practic­
al purposes complex outlook (especially as compared to Western legal 
literature).
The fourth general statement will require a somewhat lengthier treat­
ment. We shall see infra that the similar revolt of similar facts, the in many 
cases uniform lew (e. g. universal international conventions) will raise si­
milar issues, i. e. issues similar to those emerged in the West, and quite 
often similar solutions. This is the case even when the similar solutions — 
organizational, legal or scientific taxonomical forms — eventually serve by 
nature differing social and economic systems. The particular legal and 
taxonomical similarities may of course be traced back to the peculiarities 
of the domain. Namely to the circumstance that there are institutions of 
the law in whose development, by the side of the relatively smaller role of 
the production relations, the decisive factors are the almost directpervasive 
force of the productive forces, the effect of the mutual interests attached 
to the uniform stability of the international exchange of commodities, etc. 
et. In these relations, in the legal institutions bringing under regulation 
modern transport and technological relations the determining role of the 
productive forces, and their roughly uniformly developed standard, are of 
primary significance by the side of the general role of the production rela­
tions, a role by which the productive relations transmit the command of 
the productive forces to various, e. g. socialist and non-socialist directions. 
Consequently the legal form to which recourse has been had will, though 
it may serve in the one social system the one end in another the other, as 
suigeneris legal regulation be uniform or at least similar. This phenomenon 
has become the ultimate source of the development that within concrete 
institutions the what may be called East-West syntheses of comparative
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law will be not only qualifiable as socially useful legal solutions, but 
theoretically demonstrable. Thus the for their nature neutral productive 
forces will lend the guise of legitimacy to the syntheses of comparative 
law, or to the definite neutral forms of legal regulation, forms which in the 
possible domains in question will become such owing to the decisive role 
of the productive forces, which syntheses and forms will become socially 
committed for two circumstances. First, they will become socially commit­
ted because with their operation they discharge functions of active service 
in the given social-economic system which employs them. Secondly, the 
syntheses and forms are in the given social-economic system part and parcel 
of the totality of the legal system of the given type. Meanwhile the princip­
al traits of this totality will be determined by the criteria and the content 
qualifying the type of law in question as such. These criteria and content 
will at the same time in accordance with what has been set forth above pre­
vent the according to the form possible neutral forms an legal solutions 
from bringing about neutral or even foreign processes and results within 
the system.
In the period before the revolt of the facts the theoretical dispute on 
systematization was confined to how should private international law be 
conceived. Than it came to be directed to the notional expansion of private 
international law.
(a) Historically the problem first emerged in Soviet literature. Lunts 
and Pereterski were the two poles. Of the two Lunts, although he believed 
the norms of substantive law as delimited by the institutions of conflict 
law to belong to it, took position at the pole of tradit ional private interna­
tional law. In his system he dealt with this corpus of law and progessed it 
to be of the nature of civil law. Pereterski as early as 1946 laid stress on 
the norms of substantive law, for, as he stated, in reality, too, the stress 
is on these. He then evolved the concept ion that this branch was independ­
ent of civil law, strictly speaking part of public international law, the case 
being not one of a municipal civil right, but overwhelmingly of relations 
brought under regulation by the international conventions of the states. 
He gave it the name of ‘international “public” civil law1, or ’International 
law of commer cial relations.' As Boguslavskiy stated in his literary review 
this conception of Pereterski‘s was in the following left on a blind siding. 
Later Pereterski thought that traditional private international law ought to 
be modernized, and extended its scope to norms of — substantive law come 
into being on the assumption of — an international element. Whether or not 
this domain was part of civil law or international law was, as Kalensky, 
too, stated, left unanswered. From the aspect of public international law 
Usenko denied that all that had been brought under regulation by an inter­
state convention or treaty was therefore part of public international law. 
If so, this corpus of law would forfeit its specially properly so called, na­
mely that here there was the case of property — commercial — civil law 
relations, thus this body of law was left outside the sphere of interest of 
the Soviet discipline of public international law. Meanwhile Pereterski‘s 
conception also lost the t hread which else would have still been in the ‘inter-
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national law of commercial relations-', namely the corpus of the law of 
agreements on international deliveries of merchandise, international bank­
ing and credit transactions, the law of international economic organiza­
tions. In Lunts's conception all this was absent from the very beginning. 
In Lunts's new textbook (bunts-Marusheva) this has been omitted even 
at present and it has been ignored also by municipal civil law. With the 
gathering of strength by this domain of international economic relations a 
number of monographs has grown, of monographs namely which in a com­
plex approach have drawn each legal aspect of the given problems within 
their ambit (BoguslavsJciy, Altshuler, Pozdnyakov). This was somehow the 
appearance of the revolt of facts in the Soviet legal literature of the turn 
of the ‘sixties and' seventies: Protection of the sectoral frameworks, their 
expansion, resolution, differentiation within the system, opening towards 
the demands of practice and by this to complexity.
(h) What has passed off in the meanwhile in the other socialist coun­
tries ?
In Hungarian legal literature L. Réczei has taken his stand for the 
autonomous character of classical private international law, and has de­
fended his position also outwards. At certain places he has for practical 
purposes allowed a scope for the substantive norms international and 
municipal civil law. Implicitly he has recognized the need for doing justice 
to the changed conditions in a potential new arrangement. It was essen­
tially in this spirit that a Rumanian textbook of private international law 
was published in 1968 (Filipescu—Jacota). Wiemann was the first who 
in 1958 by analysing the notion of the classical private international law 
entered upon a campaign for ‘the law of international economic relations’, 
which would embrace the otality of municipal and international (mainly 
substantive and not only civil law) legislation moulding the international 
economic relations. This theory extending to the West —East relations has 
since been left to itself, although causes for it exist even today, as Seiffert 
has recently made it clear. Afterwards, as will be seen, Seiffert has taken a 
step forwards at another level and opened towards socialist international 
economic law.
In the Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian literature of private 
international law in the ‘sixties, while the facts were already revolting, 
for the time being in the guise of directly regulating norms of civil law 
nature, i.e. in the guise of municipal and international norms, another 
conception was making headway: namely private international law as 
enriched by substantive law. Accordingly the notional scope of private 
international law, by the side of norms of conflict law, i.e. classical private 
international law, would embrace all directly regulating substantive norms 
yet of civil law nature, which have turned up in the background of the 
particular institutions of conflict law, have in a great measure emptied 
them, only to allow norms of substantive law to take their place in relat ions 
def.ned as the outcome of the unification of substantive international 
legal norms. This is the common essence of the conception, though with 
by no means negligible differences made by the various authors. With
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M. Vilärjhy it is a domain of law of a doctrinal system. I. Szâszy takes his 
stand for an autonomous branch of the law. Practically this is wath the 
Polish Jakubowski professes, whereas the Czechoslovak Kalensky does 
the same with a thorough theoretical analysis. None of these authors 
expresses his respective opinion without contradictions or by making con­
cessions. as the case may be. They argue that these norms have been born 
on the assumption of foreign elements. As for their significance these norms 
weigh more than the conflict rules. They are even closely tied up with the 
totality of conflict rules, as in the event of incomplete substantive regula­
tion recourse is in each case had to the conflict rule. Further they argue 
that the method of regulation, which would lend autonomy to conflict 
law, is an unsatisfactory principle of systematization, and that heed 
should be given also to the expanding function of the social relations con­
cerned. The reasons on which they are silent are: for all kinds of reasons 
of instruction, planning, further in want of adequante research capacities 
(institutes, researchers etc.), and owing to a number of subjective factors 
this else necessary and important legal material could not ‘suddenly’ 
be 'sold under a better name’. To this we have to add the generally valid 
phenomenon in the law that the new content quite often unfolds itself 
within the framework of already existing forms, and strive for new forms 
mostly with further quantitative reinforcement only.
As regards the critique of private international law understood in this 
wider sense we would refer merely to a few circumstances which this 
wider concept has refrained from confronting, or has been unable to cope 
with. First, notwithstanding any dispute on its designation or on other 
grounds according to ‘classical’ criteria resulting from both the subject- 
matter of regulation and the method of regulation classical private inter­
national law is an unambiguously segregated branch of law. This is borne 
out by the very fact that private international law has a general part of 
its own whose theses are, like in mathematics where the values before 
the parantheses refer to all values within them, always related to the 
totality of the rules taken up in the special part. Consequently a properly 
closing system will come into being. There is trouble enough in the domain 
under study, why disturb situations which are otherwise clear? The ex- 
а88геёа е^(1 emphasis of the subject-matter of regulation will eventually 
lead us to results which though expedient are too vague for the branch of 
law concerned. This may be correct, though something should not be 
called a branch of law which it is not. It is simply unimaginable that by 
the side of the requirements of a uniform notion of private international 
law in this wide sense any textbook, monograph, i.e. some sort of a scientific 
system would be capable of embracing, in a proportionate measure, all 
conflict rules, international procedural law, the domestic status of aliens, 
and all the substantive norms of municipal or foreign origin which have 
been born on the assumption of the presence of a foreign element; or by the 
side of guardianship and conflict rules of labour law all such institutions 
as e.g. the forms of international payments, copyright, patent law, mari­
time and air transport or carriage, foreign exchange law, nationalization,
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contracts of international sales and others, or a code of international trade 
of taking up the free international movement of the enterprises, the body 
of law governing investments of aliens, and the enumeration may still 
go on. Those ahering to the concept in question could not, of course, go so 
far. Finally, they have in developing their system relied on the system of 
conflicts law. They offer the totality of it and then dependent on the de­
mands of practice within the domain of particular institutions extend 
the:r view to substantive law too.
The most significant circumstance, however, with which this con­
cept has not reckoned, which has destroyed even the notion of this even 
vaguer concept of private international law, or at least launches a fierce 
attack against it, is the yet later revolt of yet later facts, so to say the 
second wave of revolt. Notably the peculiarity of the latter years in the 
international economic relations: the mass appearance of qualitatively 
new forms of cooperation (contracts for cooperation, international in­
vestments, joint economic organizations, etc.) and in all these the sub­
stantial régulâting-participating-guiding role of the states in general, and 
its formation into large regional systems in international economic integrat­
ion in particular. This second wave lias then burst the dykes, the river 
has widened, so that it has become navigable only by the joint forces of 
ahmst all branches of the law. Yet, like on all rivers carrying a heavy 
traffic load, some sort of order is needed here too.
This has led to the appearance of the concept of international economic 
law. Although its system-creating criteria and underlying causes are uni- 
for.n this conception has three variants of significance at least.
(a) The more general concept is t hat of Blagojevic. This concept not 
only refers international economic law to the new type economic relations 
of t he socialist countries, but turns it into the carrier of universal demands. 
Economic law is more general also in the meaning of the term which in the 
argumentation qualifies economic law either as a ‘new legal discipline’, 
or as a ‘new branch of law’. Finally Blagojevic sums up by stating that 
‘we have to fight with the approach of a comprehensive international 
economic law against the reactionary forces entrenching themselves 
behind the shelter of classical public international law and other traditional 
branches of law’. In the system-creating element of his concept essentially 
the idea is implied that here we have to do with the revolutionary meta­
morphosis of international economic relations (integration, large-scale 
cooperation at state and enterprisal level, the organizational life ancl active 
political and economic activities of states and international economic organ­
izations transforming the international economic relations), relations in 
which the forced segregation of the traditional branches of law amounts 
to partly anachronism and retracting forces, relying namely on the totality 
of rules which have substantially been born for the service of the interests 
of developed capitalist countries. Against this trend only international 
economic law uniting the various forms of regulation (international law, 
fiscal law, the corresponding elements of private law, administrative law, 
economic law, labour law) is capable of giving expression to the changed
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new conditions and of serving them. As regards the universal substantive 
expansion of international economic law so conceived, this is provided 
by the following elements: the organism of the international economic 
organizations moulding international economic relations, its statutes and 
activities; the relat ion of the municipal ‘levels’ to the international regulat­
ing systems as specified before, and also to others; the re-formulation of the 
system of conditions of international economic and financial relations; 
the legal means of the economic compensation of the former colonial ter­
ritories and the developed countries; the aid of developing countries with 
means other than the traditional legal means (earlier namely the developed 
countries have dictated the means); the transformation of the recommend­
ations of the world commercial conferences into institutions of the law; 
the traditional institutions of international commercial or private law] 
and their modernization.
(b) The international economic law as developed by BoguslawsU 
is in a very unambiguous formulation a scientific discipline in its own 
right and a complex branch of the law. Although Boguslawski has not 
given the designation of a socialist international economic law, as has 
been done by Seiffert, the subject-matter comprised by it is in fact re­
stricted to the relations of the CMEA countries. Bogiislawski’s concept 
is built up on the following theoretical argumentation. The essence of the 
new concept is implied in the peculiarities of the legal relations manifesting 
themselves in the new' type economic cooperation between the socialist 
countries. In these peculiarities multiplicity is one of the decisive elements,
i.e. the coordination of the economic plans, specialization and cooperation' 
scientific and technical cooperation, financial and currency relations, thé 
different ways of enterprisal cooperation, the concrete economic (guiding 
and operative) cooperation of governmental agencies, joint investments, 
or in all these the particularly important role of the state. Another decisive 
element (strictly speaking following from the one before) is that in this 
multiplicity there is of necessity always present the organizing side of the 
state, its civil law aspects and that of the law of property. The international 
relations of the socialist countries of economic law are hence given by the 
intertwining totality of legal relations which comes into being between 
the states, state agencies, organizations and enterprises. Although the 
norms bringing under regulation these legal relations are derived from 
the realms of the various branches of law, in addition to close cooperation 
a qualitatively new category comes into being: the legal relations of inter­
national economic law, and following from these taxonomicallv the com­
plex branch of international economic law, and scientifically the auto­
nomous discipline of it whose subject-matter is exactly the exploration 
of this complex branch of law and, within the scope of, it, of the tendencies 
and laws valid in it. The dscipline of international economic law so con­
ceived would, in its general part, embrace the subject-matter, methods 
and subjects-at-law, whereas the special part would discuss the following 
questions: 1. interstate coordination of the economic plans; 2. specialization 
and cooperation; 3. cooperation in scientific research and in technology;
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4. cooperation in transport and telecommunication: 5. foreign trade 
relations in the narrower sense of t he term; 6. direct cooperation of govern­
mental agencies in investments and joint institutions; 7. credit and financial 
relations; 8. industrial property; 9. employment of foreign labour; 10. in­
creased responsibility of subjects at law taking part in international 
economic relations; regulation of legal disputes.
(c) Whereas according to Boguslawski t here canbe no talk of an autono­
mous, i. e. not only complex, branch of law before in the process of econom­
ic integration legal material has come forth from the nature of the econom­
ic integration in an amount adequate for its establisment, Seiffert on his 
part would not agree to the autonomy of international economic law as a 
separate branch of law were acceptable only if conditioned by a more un­
folded legal regulation of integration. As he states, any branch of law will 
have to record not only what exists, it is in being not only when all its 
elements stand ready. If this were what we profess than we should be argu­
ing the creative function of socialist law. Socialist international economic- 
law is (here the case is expressly chat of the socialist international eco­
nomic law), therefore, with Seiffert an autonomous branch of lew and also 
a branch of science in being: it is a branch of law and a discipline giving 
expression to the socialist economic integration. The subjects at law ot 
this branch of law are the states, subjects of the nature of public interna­
tional law, above all the CMEA as such, international sectoral agencies, 
governmental agencies, and international and domestic economic organi­
zations i. e. enterprises. The law-creating and lawapplving teleology of 
integrated co-efficacy of norms by nature traditionally different, bringing 
under regulation the co-operative relations of these subjects at law is 
what is specific and what lends a character. From the side of the sources 
of law here we have the case of a corpus of law joint ly established by the 
CMEA countries, or jointly planned by them with the claim to uniform 
validity, a corpus of law living under the rule of direct regulation. Like 
Boguslawski Seiffert, too, points out that strictly speaking the novelty 
exists in the complex regulation of the planning and bartering relations 
in the intertwining of organizational and property relations.' As re­
gards its concrete positive spectrum this socialist international economic 
law of the international division of labour and international cooperation 
brings under regulation relations in the process of economic integ­
ration unfolding themselves in ehe domain of exchange and turnover of 
goods and intellectual property, more explicitly witlvn the scope of the 
following issues: 1. coordination and adjustment of the prognostications 
of economic policy, production plans, technical and technologcal cooperat­
ion; 2. specialization, cooperation, standardization; 3. coord nat'on of 
foreign trade programmes; 4. coordination of investments and the format­
ion of joint enterprises; 5. barter relations and their preconditions, here- 
included price calculation and inter-enterprisal connnonod tv-money relat­
ions; 6. system of payment; 7. transport; 8. inter-state guiding agencies 
and their activities; 9. the statutes of different international agencies; 1Ü. 
commercial and shipping conventions, etc.
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Meanwhile a conception of international economic law of another 
‘cross-section- has made its appearance in the German Democratic Repub­
lic, which under the designation Aussenwirtschaftsrecht (Law od freign eco­
nomy) not only presents a peculiar formal des ignation but at the same time 
is as for its content also of a different kind. International economic law 
according this concept essentially embraces the municipal system of norms 
of the German Democratic Republic of economic law nature governing 
foreign trade transactions (in the List of References: Wirtschaftsrecht und 
Aussenwirtschaftsrechl). Thus in the German Democratic Republic more 
branches of law deal with the law of international economic relations, 
among others the socialist international economic law, the law of foreign 
trade and private international law.
In the borderland of the three worlds, the socialist, capitalist and that 
of thedeveloping countries, or in their interrelations and relations develo­
ping amidst innumerous contradictions, mainly at the pressure of the devel­
oping countries and sponsored by a socialist world the New International 
Economic Order has made its appearance as summed up in a normative 
system, i. e. on the one part as the Declaration of the New International 
Economic Order as approved by the Extraordinary General Assembly of 
UNO, and on the other, the Charter on the Economic Rights and Obligat­
ions of the States as approved by the XXIXth (1974) General Assembly 
of UNO. These instruments and the efforts for creating a nes order in world 
economics are for many reasons events of decisive importance, also for the 
law. 1* irst, they indicate the fact of a change of eras in world economics and 
forecast the new elements of the future. Secondly, they give expression to 
the fact that the progressive development of world economic relations and 
processes are by far more than the reform of institutions of civil or commer­
cial law. Here state and public iaw guidance have and will have a decisive 
role. Viewing things from the present heading we have to make it clear 
that so far jurisprudence has as for contents and taxonomicallv assiimilated 
little of the legal developments. All that Hungarian literature has offered 
is but the active response of the literature of political economy . What 
must be taken for granted, however, is that here we have the case of uni­
versal and normative legal instruments which sum up the legal order of 
world economy in statu nascendi in some sort of a new synthesis, and which 
will no doubt be more than any attempt at synthetization so far made.
3. General experiences resulting from the revolt as viewed by juris­
prudence
Within the synopsis of general experiences and the almost spontane­
ously following conclusions f rst a few experiential facts will have to be given 
shape.
(a) 1 he revolt of the facts has shaken to the r foundation the earlier 
traditional systems of branches of law, or the trad tional systems of views 
relating to them, and started a process offer dentation.
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(b) As regards private international law the revolt of facts has been 
complete for the fate of this branch of law and discipline, a circumstance 
which has been followed by the object ive coercion of a new arrangement.
(c) Therefore, it is the objectively pressing task of the discipline of 
this domain of law to lead the revolt of the facts manifesting thsemselves 
in quantitative and qualitative changes into a reasonable and construct­
ive system.
(d) Not even the in point of principle pragmatist Common Law Legal 
thinking can deny, and the jurisprudence of the Continent, in particular of 
the socialist countries expressly professes, that a theoretical systematizat­
ion is not only the traditional value and in general the essential element of 
jurisprudential cognition and teaching, but at the same time a significant 
element in practice intent to exercise an effect on reality and in the consci­
ous moulding of practice.
(e) From the point of view of the theory of science the fermentation 
in jurisprudence or the appearance of the different interpretations and con­
cepts on the one side are the natural and inevitable concomitant phenomena 
of the background social reality, and, on the other, two intertwining phases 
of the development of the given branch of science. The first phase is the 
one of which the appearance of the new phenomena is characteristic on 
the one part, and on the other, that science for the interpretation of the 
new phenomena and for their theoretical understanding builds up new 
concepts and strives for initial generalization. In the second phase of the 
construction of theory and system, in the meaning of the theory of science, 
the specification of thé notions, their related to new factual development 
adequate formulat ion and built upon these the construction of a possibly 
coherent theory or system unfold themselves. I t  is an almost unarguable 
fact that jurisprudence is in the given domain in the depths of this second 
phase.
(f) On the other hand it is a fact and also reality that the theoretical 
responses and concepts substantially differ from one another and offer 
the picture of multifariousness: the facts are given different interpretations, 
and thus those interpret ing them come to different concepts, the study of 
the causes of which would go beyond the scope of the present work.
Speaking of the agreements and discrepancies we are, in a general way, 
tempted to the statement that
(a) in this revolt of the facts classical private international law is 
the “losing” party. It was unable to receive this process into itself. As re­
gards the role of private international law left over after this defeat, opi­
nions are widely divergent.
The purest of all formulae is the one that leaves private international 
law what it is, namely what it always was: the in the presence of all signifi­
cant criteria well clinching system of conflicts law. Even there is plenty of 
movement, namely in view of the substantive legal systems giving expres­
sion to the new conditions the institutions of conflict law and its principles 
themselves undergo a metamorphosis.
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The second formula is the one which into private international law in­
troduces all rules of substantive law which on the assumption of the foreign 
element have been born at home or internationally. This formula then goes 
on disintegrating: according to certain ideas it is a branch of law, accord­
ing to others a coherent domain of the law, an only scientifically consolidat­
ed so-called doctrinal system. According to the yet further ‘fission1 con­
flicts law is the life-giving or system-creating element of this kind of a more 
general private international law, whereas others want to discover the prin­
cipal trend in the substantive regulation and the body of substantive law.
There is yet another systematization which goes somewhat beyond 
the one supra, and introduces certain administrative-organizational ele­
ments into the private international law of a more general sense (e. g. for­
eign exchange law, a little of the international economic organizations), 
still quantitatively not an amount which would burst completely the en­
velope of private international law.
Strictly speaking the convex of this formula is the international eco­
nomic law, community law, or international commercial law approach or 
the eradiation of the law of international economic relations which intro­
duces into the complex systems conforming to these conceptions from the 
classical private international law what virtually appears as a legal element 
of the given phenomenon, and where it appears to be warranted.
(b) A relatively great, perhaps dominant part of the musical composi­
tion here presented which by the side of the leitmotif of complexity strives 
for new forms, new systems, new designations. The leitmotif, however, is 
subject to considerable variations.
There is the international commercial law idea which accepting the 
charge of theoretical vagueness embraces the totality of international eco­
nomic relations. Here pragmatically complexity is everything, therefore 
theoretically it will not lend itself for differentiation.
At other places by the name of international economic law complexity 
is at least a complex branch of law;
at yet another place it is by the same name the decisive structural 
element of an autonomous branch of law;
whereas, owing to the weight of the organizational dynamics of the 
integration, it is there the domain of a specific mixed specialized law, by 
the name of Community law the mutation of classical Western economic law 
on Community level.
There are certain concepts of international economic law which relate 
only to the conditions of integration. Others are of the width of a type of 
law, however, without West-East relevances. Again other complexities will 
appear with the claim to universality.
As has been seen the notion of the law of international economic rela­
tions as formulated by Wiemann would though embrace all that related to 
international economic relations, still it has failed to break through its 
chrysalis, so that we are at a loss to tell what would have become of it.
(c) This transports us already to the other, perhaps also decisive, yet 
second-rate, fairly generally followed, yet not always named, motive, name-
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ly to the order of magnitude of the corpus of law concerned and to its sig­
nificance among the legal norms of the given country. If at present for a 
given country or legal system, as the case may be, the modern phenomena 
of international economic relations are as for quantity and weight of subs­
tantial amount, then practice (the different institutions of economic and 
legal policy) and jurisprudence ought to embrace them. Practice and ju­
risprudence cannot, however, live up reasonably to this demand in some 
sort of an undifferentiated totality. Therefore within the grand total the 
differentiation will come about in addition to which it will become funct­
ionally expedient and necessary with a fairly great force to embrace, cul­
tivate, systematize part domains, something which by itself also carries 
the force of a discipline or svstemcreating factor. Yet whereas for certain 
students this factor is a mere reason for the division of labour, for others 
it is the delimiting criterion of a scientific discipline, and for yet others 
an auxiliary (seldom decisive) criterion of the branch of law.
(d) In connexion with the sphere of agreements and discrepancies 
also the experience will have to be remembered that several divergent con­
cepts (systems, domains, branches) are known by a uniform designation, 
and many on the grounds of the inperfections of the designation attack the 
carrier of the name. Still carrying on a debate in this manner, or arguethe 
validity of something, is perhaps meaningless. The rise of something to 
the level of a notion is though an essent ial phase of scientific cognition and 
an essential element of the use of scientific categories. Still this is a com­
plex concept and in particular at the definition of complex concepts we 
find outselves in trouble with the wisdom of the words. Correctly massive 
definitions and designations cannot be conceived unless in their technical 
meaning and are to be understood in conjunction with the notional con­
tents as set forth in the analysis using them. It would be ungrounded to 
demand that the linguistic designation of a notion (branch of law, discip­
line of jourisprudence, domain of law) should include everything and 
should carry the exact meaning of the words actually used. If this were 
done, not only e. g. the designations of private international law or econo­
mic law wouid become arguable (the one becuase, as is said, it is neither 
international nor only private, the other because economy embraces all and 
cannot, therefore, be a delimiting criterion), but even designations as civil 
law, which is by far more than ’civil’ only. This law is namely as much the 
law of state enterprises and other economic organizations as of citizens.
4. The facts in Hungary and the response of Hungarian jurisprudence
to them
The revolt of facts is of moment also in Hungary, moreover even more 
momentous than in general. In view of the extremely strong foreign trade ori- 
entedness of Hungary, this statement does not call for further attestation. 
E. g. it is straightforward by itself that the body of norms giving expression 
to the participation of Hungary in the world economy and to the integrated
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cooperation of the CMEA countries, is a huge totality of norms; this in its 
subject-matter and content coherent complex material of law as for its 
form carrying the criteria of several branches of law embraces all norms 
which bring under regulation Hungarian foreign commerce partly with 
provisions of municipal origin, partly with bilateral and multilateral con- 
\ entions and other norms, partly with joint normatives appearing in the 
CMEA integration. It stands to reason that here we haveto do with a bulk 
of provisions of 1 a w  quantitatively amounting to several volumes.
Hungarian jurisprudence has not as yet an unambiguous response of 
systematization to this complex and centripetal totality of norms and pro­
visions. For a time though jurisprudence could keep abreast of develop­
ments. With varying intensity and in a varying measure it filled up private 
international law overwhelmingly with civil law norms and to a lesser de­
gree with such of a different nature, and has given it the name of private 
international law of a doctrinal system and in the wider meaning of the 
term. Jurisprudence tacitly or expressly neglected designations like inter­
national economic 1 aw or a system of other name, and even protested aga­
inst them. What still happened was that a small portion of publications, 
textbooks, etc. appeared under the flag of the various branches of law (e.’ 
g. the decision making mechanism of CMEA, relations of international fisc­
al law. foreign trade management). These, however, did not only fail to 
strive for some sort of a taxonomic completeness (a completeness namelv 
of the given relations of foreign commerce which could be grasped from the 
side of the branch of law in question), still viewed even from the side of 
quantity and intensity are faraway from what aus needed in this domain. 
The whole 'matter’ thus remained the care of civil laworprivate internation­
al law in the wider sense, where in a casual manner the cultivators of other 
branches of law or science lent a helping hand with a fairly spontaneous 
and far from satisfactory degree of intensity. In such a form then monograph­
ic or other summarizing-reviewing writings made their appearance and 
ser\ed the practical needs which had emerged, so e. g. on foreign trade 
monopoly (Mâdl), on international cnterprisal associations (Sarkozy -  
Fabian), on certain legal problems of integration ( Kiss. Mddl), on social­
ist international enterprises (Kiss), on the decision-making mechanism 
of CMEA and the Common Market ( \ 'alki, Ustor), on the General Condi­
tions of Delivery of Goods (Szdsz), on the law of international financial 
transactions ( Meznerics) , on the body of knowledge of international com­
mercial law (Bânrévy).
These are by themselves remarkable achievements, one is tempted to 
state that the revolt of facts has in these cleared the path for itself in Hun­
garian jurisprudence and economics sciences. Still we can hardly approve 
of the situation where in Hungarian jurisprudence and legal thinking this 
huge totality of norms in question find themselves in the matter of theore­
tical system-creation and corresponding cultivation, of a situation namely 
which owing partly to the unsettledness of the frontiers, partly for reasons 
of capacity, still mostly because the given body of law partly for quantita­
tive, partly for theoretical-taxonomicai reasons has in its complexity no
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room in the traditional branches and disciplines, cannot be comprised by a 
single traditional branch of law with the required complexity.
The today sufficiently universal conviction of Hungarian jurispruden­
ce that it has to makeastep further from this situation as regards teaching, 
scientific research work as well as a number of practical relations, is gener­
ally known. This is the conclusion to which the Committee of Administrat­
iv e  and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has come in 
the course of a debate dealing with the problem.
5. The search for a new response and the earlier systems
On the search for the notional framework of a system-building of scien­
tific standards we have to set out from the understanding that scientific 
cognition has to lead us to a reflection where the reflecting medium synthe- 
ticizes and reflects the beams of light received from the following two deci­
sive elements of social reality. The one element is put together of the eco­
nomic and legal facts whose revolt forms the subject-matter of the present 
discussion. We have before our selves not only the mass of these facts, but 
also as another item the fact that in the given economic an legal reality 
there is a strong cohesion: namely the symbiosis of the administrative-or­
ganizational element transmitting state influence and guidance and ofthe 
commodity relations carrying enterprisal elements, a symbiosis which 
partly is İıistroica! exigency, partly the enlivening pledge of creative ad­
vance. This is the symbiosis where the tension of the dialectical contro­
versy, struggle and unity of the two elements has to be developed also 
with the means of juripspnulence in the direction of an optimum. And it 
is here where the second decisive element steps into the scene, the element 
namely which in the proper reflection has to be present. This second ele­
ment is the relatively autonomous character of the law, i. e. the law, 
though expression of the economic-social relation, so e. g. somehow also of 
the structure of economy, has to be even by itself a coherent system of ex­
pression in a way, however, that it reasonably serves its principal function 
proper, viz. that it transfers human consciousness into correct volitional 
activity or active repercussion. If we tried to transmit jurisprudence as the 
general human consciousness relating to the law to virtual activity irres­
pective ofthe above exigency, then we should slash the law to the varying 
multitude of branches according to the subject of regulation (economic, 
social, political, administrative, etc.). So law would cease to be an in and 
by itself uniform reflexive system and would become a mirror broken to 
pieces at the impact of outer impulses, where nobody could find his bear­
ings anymore, each of the divergent refracting angles pointing elsewhere. 
Jurisprudence, if it wants to reflect correctly and help practice, can but 
give attention to the relative independence of the law and its intrinsic 
tendencies and laws.
By the side of the exigency of this reflexiveexpressive process private 
international la win its differently expanded forms is not capable of conso­
lidating the totality of the revolting facts into a system. In the first place
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it does not fail here because the concepts differently expanding private in­
ternational law are not uniform and do not even go as far, but because the 
reason why these concepts do not go as far. I t  stands to reason namely 
that even the most extensively interpreted private international law will fail 
when it comes to grasp the norms of integration of CMEAor the Common 
Market. The authors of private international law are hard put to it even 
when it comes to cope with the corpus of substantive civil law of internation­
al turnover, although they are making efforts in this sense at least in prin­
ciple on the plea of this being an autonomous branch of law or a doctrinal 
domain of law, or if only by having recourse to the use of a congeries of 
appendices. Incidentally they lay stress not only on a single element, or let 
us say method, of regulation, but rather on its motive, notably that regula­
tion has been born on the assumption of a foreign element. Meanwhile 
they appear to ignore, or are at least unaware of, that in this way they toler­
ate in the method of regulation as one of the generally accepted criterion 
of systematization, extremely heterogeneous forms (direct regulation, con­
flict rules, civil law and administrative elements although exactly the de­
fenders of these concepts are the staunchest oppenents of all non-orthodox 
(e. g. economic law) solutions, and at the same time the fervent advocates 
of the traditional methods. Since the main drift of the corpus of law in 
question neither has a place in this private international law nor would 
even those concepts squeeze it into it which by the tacit or express resoluit- 
ion of the criteria of systematization nevertheless enumerate a lot of other 
things; since further this leads to a disorder within the system even where 
there would be order anyhow, it appears to be the best and theoretically 
the most consistent wav out to leave private international law what it is, 
and recognize the function for which it has been born, i. e. to allow it to 
remain conflicts aw and so one of the autonomous branches of the legal 
system whose function is, in the event of the collision of legal systems, in 
want of a uniform regulation of substantive law to lead to the establish- 
ment of the legal system to be applied. The social relations embraced by 
private international law is the scope of international personal and property 
relations in whose substantive law in general the commodity form or jux­
taposition prevails, on which by the name of private international lawt wo 
further segregating elements buildup. First, the method of indirect regulat­
ion, and, secondly, that the branch of law so come into being has, thanks 
the normative and theoretical theses of, its general and special parts, a 
closed hierarchical system. In addition to the earlier views and considera­
tions we would lay special stress on this system of hierarchy. The general 
rules in the normative sense comprise the totality of the special rules. As 
general rules these general rules cannot be replaced by others, and the speci­
al rules operate together with them. I t  would be scientifically difficult to 
contest the character of an autonomous branch of law of a totality of legal 
rules so unambiguously having a prehistory, social and legal purpose, fur­
ther such a closed method of regulation.
I t  is an altogether different matter that private international law so 
conceived has so remarkably been thrust to the background in particular
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in the field of economic relations. As general ultimate solution private in­
ternational law is, however, even there of significance. Also, it is an alto­
gether different matter that private international law, simultaneously 
with the revolt of facts, above all with the change of contents of the insti­
tutions of substantive I aw, also undergoes remarkable changes, changes 
which in Hungary ought to be laid down in a codification of private inter­
national law.
All tlvs does not. however, alter the fact that private international 
law as understood in the above (and original) meaning in this concept in a 
relatively optimal manner is in agreement with the conditions of reflect­
ion: reiving on the undrling personal and trading conditions it expresses 
the one side of social reality with the peculiarities of the regulation resorted 
to, and by this offers, within its own sphere, a system of means of clear-cut 
contents for social activity (teaching, science and practice).
Колс when private international 1алу is seceding in this way from the 
domination of the revolt of facts in this manner, will the totality of rules 
which for Hungary too isa decisive part of thelawof international econom­
ic relations remain a branch, or branches of law ?
The reply will, following from the exigencies of a correct reflection as 
outlined above, sound that this complex entity of law does not put on the 
form of an autonomous branch of law. In the assumed correctness of this 
statement the circumstance that as has been seen the various authors give 
very different designations (such as international commercial law, interna­
tional economic law, socialist international economic law, etc.) to the legal 
material in quetion, while turning it into a comlex or autonomous branch 
of law, is of secondary importance only.
The principal cause of negation lies in the circumstance that the sys­
tem-building theory has to be correct viewed from both the side of the legal 
peculiarities of the legal regulation applied as well as the side of the relative 
autonomy of the given economic phenomenon (the body of law ruled bv 
the centripetal forces of the international economic relations).
It is true that in the mixed corpus of law in question coherence is 
brought about by the essential elements, viz. the coherent knowledge and 
means needed for the ‘control* of the given branch of economy; the condi­
tionedness of the economic movements of enterprisal level on international 
and domestic organizational and administrative dynamics, something that 
has become a characteristic new trait of international operative econom- 
mic relations; the from this starting point organically resultant phenome­
non that the means of the law by its various branches have to be operated 
in complex interaction; that a number of comprehensive normatives are by 
themselves also complex and have effects on such forthcoming later only 
(e. g. the Complex Programme of the CMEA, to mention single only), etc. 
It is certain that by all this a new quality comes into being . The question 
remains to be asked, whether by this a new quality comes into being in the 
meaning of a branch of law ? And it is at this place where for reasons of corr­
ect cognition, practical clear concepts and the optimal legal ‘control sys­
tem* of the development of international economic relations, the answer
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has to be a decided No. This is a matter not only of designation. Wat will 
become, for the time being only at the level of names and formal notions, 
the designation of the traditional branches of law, if groups of phenomena 
of a different character have also been invested with the attributes of the 
branches of law ?
If the element classification is given to the compounds formed of ele­
ments, then we either, unscientifically, cuddle things up, or have to give 
other names to the elements. There is no other way out of the quandary 
than to consider a branch of law what in reality it is. And what in fact is a 
branch of law that has already been made clear in connexion with private 
international law. Therefore the statement that the corpus of law is for 
the purpose of the method of regulation, the applicability of a possible ge­
neral part in the normative meaning of the term, possibly for the purpose of 
uniform codification not homogeneous and even by this title inappopriate 
to put on the guise of the branch of law is without further demonstration 
st rai ghtforward.
Furthermore, however complex is a smaller or larger set of law of inter­
national or municipal origin, the elements of the particular branches of 
law will not eventually lose their individual properties, or their principal 
role to contribute with their individual nature of being an element to the 
birth of the given compound, moreover the agent causing the complexity 
does not even intend that they lose it, for from this moment onwards it 
would not even know with what means it operated and also because such a 
loss of properties would become the source of incalculable confusion. As 
for its legal nature such a norm would, by the content of its dogmatic struc­
ture, if dissolved into its last rational elements, be either of civil law nature 
because with the appropriate sanctions it presupposes the juxtaposition of 
the parties, or of the nature of administrative law, because it presupposes 
sub- and superordination with the appropriate sanctions, or of the nature 
of criminal law with the sanction of criminal law, or of the nature of public 
international law with the definite of subject sphere, system of sanctions 
and procedural order of public international law, etc. The case is not one 
as if even in a single paragraph all these could not be present in conjunct­
ion. E. g. for the validity of a contract incorporating an international ele­
ment in addition to the civil law criteria of validity, loaded by other, non- 
civil law sanctions, foreign trade, administrative or foreign exchange per­
mits will also be needed. The joint presence of these elements in a definite 
paragraph does not deprive the one element of its civil law nature, or ano­
ther of its administrative character. There also remains the fact that in the 
background of the one or the other paragraph each a large totality of rules 
of substantive or procedural law, or of private international law will go on 
living together with their general and special norms, and that occasionally 
recourse may have to be had to them. The same holds also for a large com­
plex of norms where (in the form of a statute, convention, etc.) in a decisive 
number civil law provisions have been incorporated, however, with accom­
panying provisions of procedural law, public international law, labour 
law, administrative law or criminal law. E. g. in the Model Statutes of Inter-
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national Economie Organizations of the CMEA all these are present. All 
these heterogeneous elements are there, are called to exercise a joint effect, 
still by preserving the identity of their nature and the maintenance of the 
efficiency of this identity. With a very definite knowledge and distinction 
of the peculiarities of the elements of civil law and public international 
law and a corresponding complexity are, e. g., those CMEA conditions being 
developed which deal with the material liability for the economic under­
takings of the states.
We cannot close this trend of thought but with the following conclu­
sion: the corpus of law in question will not be turned into a new branch of 
law by its complexity and the character of a symbiotic medley. It is someth­
ing else which may be applied to the new quality. This something else is 
the new response in question for which we have been searching (the justi­
fication of which will have to attain the possible complete accomplishment, 
hopefully, at the end of this study): the corpus of provisions of law govern­
ing Hungaryts international economic relations is for reason of he weight 
of the Mali у of rules, the 'peculiarities of regulation and Us function a coherent, 
complex f  ield of law, which scientifically can be considered as an autonomous 
discipline, and most rationally designated as the ’law of international economic 
relations'.
II  THE NEW RESPONSE: THE ‘LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS' -  ITS NOTIONAL SCOPE AND 
PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE CONTENT OF ITS SUBJECT
MATTER
1. The notional scope of the ’law of international economic relations’
1. The notional scope of the ‘law of international economic relations.‘ 2. 
Principal content elements of the subject-matter of the ‘law on international 
economic relations.1
The descriptive-explanatory definition supra raises the law of interna­
tional economic relations now to the level of notional definition. This at 
the same time wants to say that the law of international economic relations 
has to be understood by the meaning of its definite notional signs. These 
are the following:
(a) The reasons of the normative side
The first element relates to the normative side of the notion, the charact­
er of the field of law, mainly to the circumstance that for the weight of 
the totality of norms, the peculiarities and function of regulation the cor­
pus of lawin question is a coherent, complex field of the law (why it is not 
branch of law has been made clear above). The reasons:
(a) The quantity and prominent significance of the totality of provi­
sions of law as given are under circumstances as they exist here in certainty 
beyond argument.
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(b) In like way it is hard to contest that this totality of provisions of 
law is with its claim to complexity owing to the circumstances referred to 
to a considerable extent without a master or home among the various bran­
ches of law.
(c) One of the consolidating elements is the fact that overwhelmingly 
compescial and economic condit ions provide the subject-matter of regula­
tion.
(d) It is to some extent a peculiarity of regulation that it incorporates 
yet another aspect of the commescal and economic relations in question, 
namely that here we have the case of international eommescial and econo­
mic relations and that therefore regulation is born and developing in the 
assumption of some sort of a foreign element.
(e) One of the decisive reasons is, however, the peculiarity of the legal 
regulation that actually the regulation of international economic proces­
ses characteristically takes place through the ensemble of norms for their 
nature differing by branches of law. This follows from the actually quali- 
fying peculiarity of the international economic relations that the civil law 
forms or those of commercial law channelling the establishment of econo­
mic relations live and operate conditioned by the forms by way of which 
the state or interstate institutions of economic policy carry into effect 
their international economy organizing (guiding, influencing and operat­
ing) functions. This is valid also for concrete transaction. E. g. purchase 
according to the General Conditions of Delivery of Goods, or a contract 
of cooperation between East and West passes through the complex of regu­
lation in several branches of the law. The contract is pai't of municipal 
mechanism of licensing (qultimately of planning), and taking on a civil 
law- form enters the phase of international substantive civil or commercial 
law. In this process it meets systems of quota, customs and other inter­
state conditions, within the payment phase it comes into contact with 
currentg regulations, rules of international financial law and possbilv with 
conflicts law. Still this is the case with any larger interstate venture. E. g. 
the construction of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline or the Orenburg Gas Pipelines 
takes place within the coherent complex system of interstate and inter- 
enterprisal agreements, and municipal measures of economic administrat­
ion. Beyond the general undertaking of obligations and guaranteeing the 
corresponding portion of their national territory the states undertake the 
creation of the appropriate investing enterprises and the operation of the 
civil law mechanism required for their functioning.
(f)  I t is at this place where another of the decisive reasons joins in. 
Like in a symphonic orchestra the totality of each a type of instruments 
here, too, the parts will differ not only epistemologically, so to say in their 
static nature, but also for their function, effects, considerations of opera­
tion, practicable principles of operation, i. e. from the dynamic aspect. 
The parts may differ from one another, and yet constitute a solid, coherent 
unity. This unity embraces all principles and methods which relate to the 
nature of the particular homogeneous elements, the mutual rational and 
practical interrelation of the various homogeneous elements, the relation
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of the multifarious linking up of the various elements to the unity as a 
whole, the direct and in their principal interrelations general objectives 
of the unity as a whole. For all these both the creative artist and the con­
ductor, that is the making and the applying of the law will have to embrace 
the knowledge of all these. This cannot be done unless in the reasonable 
order of them. This order is the complex filed of the law of international eco­
nomic relations, which does not consist in the legitimate system of a code, 
but finds expression in the unity and differentiation of a theoretically ver­
ified system. In this unity, for the purpose of the coherent development of 
international economic relations in a complex connexion the following 
appear at the time
— the general tendencies and efforts of economic policy resulting from 
the development of economic and social relations and relating to the given 
domain;
— the tendencies and efforts resulting from the international political 
economic and scientific-technical system of assumptions of the country;
— the prevalence of the general principles formulated in the law of 
international relations and of their dynamics;
— the subjects having a decisive role in shaping the international eco­
nomic relations and their function: above all the state and the agencies of 
integration in the socialist economic system, other international agencies 
formulating or also formulating the economic policy, and finally, the sub­
jects of the sui generis enterprisal level;
— t he complexes of municipal provisions of law or such of international 
law resulting from the various domains differing by branches of law, or 
consolidating there.
(g) The unity creating circumstance conceivable also as segregated 
reason, namely that in the whole of the given totality of rules numerous 
normatively formulated principles will also make their appearance, princ­
iples notably which embrace the whole corpus of law (such as e. g. the princ­
iples of equality of rights and of non-interference, the principle of the mu­
tual guarantee of the benefits, the principle of the sovereign disposal of 
national assets, the most-favoured-nation clause, the foreign trade mono­
poly, etc.) is implied already in what has been set forth above. These prin­
ciples merely reinforce the theses that the law of international economic 
relations is a relatively segregated coherent complex domain of the law.
(b) Boundaries, borderline cooperation, intcsnal differentation
Sith its meaning as defined earlier, its infolding and protruding bor­
ders, with its uncertain borderland of varying dpeth. the term field of law 
will be of help to us whenever we are in search for the reply to yet another 
actual question, namely where does the boundary of this complex domain 
of law lie? The wisdom of the term already signals the reply: there is an 
inner, domestic part of the domain, the basic material of the domain of 
law, and there are borderline regions where the domain of law in question
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already becomes intertwined with adjacent domains, here occupying more 
or less from the neighbour, or vice vers there lending more, there less, to 
the neighbour.
In a more concrete form: which facts find a place in this domain owing 
to the revolt of facts, has in its outlines been clarified before. Here the quest­
ion to be answered is: whether all of the corpus of law concerned belongs 
to this field of law. and whether this corpus belongs to the 'jurisdiction4 
or 'competence4 of this domain only. The answer is a decided No.
The theoretical boundaries of affiliation or of the basic material are 
as has been made clear: the commercial-civil law channels giving expres­
sion to the process of internationalization of production, development, 
transport and trade, together with the controlling-guiding-forming lock 
and control systems with the aid of which the state and interstate agencies 
operate these channels. Hence to this domain strictly speaking only the 
civil or commercial law level and the non-civil law structures built on the 
former or in direct contact with them, are affiliated, or more explicitly, 
the norms of administrative, international, etc. law which accommodate 
the civil law mechanism in the system of conditions of the catalyzers trans­
mitting state guidance. There is, however, also a third level in the stratif­
ication of norms relating to international economic relations (on the assump­
tion that the 1 rst level is the lower one, carrying into effect virtual econ­
omic relations, the second that of the controlling and guiding means of the 
state and other public law agencies), namely that of the organizational 
and procedural, and partly administrative nôrms within the framework 
of which the state and other public law agencies shape their measures of 
influence and guidance, i. e. the corpus of norms of the second level. This 
is already a category which for its affiliation is a twofaced one. First, de­
pendent on the given concrete assumption, also the law of international 
economic relations has to extend to this category, in a loose or decided man­
ner. secondly, however, this category is part and object of the generality 
of the other branch of law concerned.
This is evident even in this theoretical generalization, vet let us quote 
a few examples from the field of the facts of the revolt. For the validity of 
an international sales contract the licence of the foreign trade authority 
may be required specially for the import or the export as. the case may be. 
Here also measures of the customs authorities may have a word to say. 
Now the administrative acts in question are already parts of the order of 
another generality, in the present instance of that of administrative law, 
although the administrative acts receive their sense and existence from 
the sense and content of the underlying transaction. Still the customs syst­
em or the administrative agencies of foreign trade, i. e. where these acts 
are born, are as this third level in general already part of another field. 
Now in a wider complexity, our field is concerned here in so far as is regu­
larly relevant for its operation (e. g. in so far as which licence is issued by 
which authority, or whether within each an authority there is a hierarchical 
level, and if as which, and a procedure aligned to it). This carries to a more 
general example: to the organizational structure of the foreign trade mo-
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nopoly. In the entire system of the governmental agencies foreign trade 
administration, too, is a special administrative problem. Viewed from the 
domain of the law of international economic relations beyond the foreign 
trade enterprises, or enterprises invested with the right to transact foreign 
trade deals, or mixed enterprises operating with foreign participation, this 
special problem amounts to the specific role of the state, e. g. the formation 
and the sphere of operation of the enterprises, the guidance of their act­
ivities with plans and other means, and in all that the level of the 
particular governmental agencies, their jurisdiction and obligations. 
Thus e. g. the foreign trade act is from above object and source 
of the administrative law, from below (or rather from the inside) 
it is the object and source also of the law of international economic relati­
ons. In the body of norms of the CMEA accumulated so far the lower, civil 
law level, has not confronted us with problems. The second level, i. e. all 
kinds of administrative and procedural norms (recommendations, the foun­
dation of joint agencies, establishment of cooperations, adjustment of 
plans, formulation of development programmes) in like way does not con­
stitute a problem. The third level, however, viz. the operating mechanism 
of the CMEA as a whole means complexes organizational, administrative 
and procedural norms of a quantity and weight which on the one part 
reinforce this third level to greater strength, and on the other, this level 
becomes a matter of special wight also of public international law. Since, 
however, the third level is as a whole the indispensable system of condit­
ions of the operation of the economic processes materializing at the medi­
um and lower level, or the other way round: since the third level has amean- 
ing only in respect of the medium and lower levels, the fundamental el­
ements of the upper level should be understood as included in the law of 
international economic relations.
The law of international economic relations on this understanding 
should not, however, be conceived so as if, by the side of a most consis­
tently established unity, there were no natural moreover desirable, inter­
nal differentiation, a practiealv more intense consolidation and cultivation 
of certain part domains of this law, e. g. the law of international sales, or 
in general the law of foreign trade contracts, international patent law, the 
law of international transports, the law of international settlements, or 
what with the growth of the relevant corpus of norms and owing to its ex­
treme significance insists on an internal autonomy, namely the law of eco­
nomic integration. This differentiation is in general not unknown in the 
law: both in the fields of legislation and practice as well as the discipline. 
This is as natural as within civil law the differentiation into the law, of 
contracts, the 1 aw of persons, company law, patent law, etc.
(c) The died pline and its reasons
After what has been said of the normative side of the law of internatio­
nal economic relations and the nature of its domain the presentation of the 
nature of the discipline and its character will givecause for fewer difficul­
ties.
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We may dispense with demonstrating that the disciplines of jurispru­
dence are not restricted to the traditional branches of law; that the law of 
international economic relations abounds in normative objects to what it 
applies, since ultimately all theories and disciplines of jurisprudence have 
to refer to positive law (its development, nature, etc.); that the law of inter­
national economic relations is a relatively segregable coherent totalitv of 
provisions of law and so normatively it is capable of following the discipline 
built on it on a long path; that this domain of the law has even normatively 
formulated general principles which at the same time reflect the general 
tendencies and laws to be explored by the discipline. But the discipline has 
to go further: First, it has to explore the scoial and economic background 
of this field in a wider and profound sense, advance its development with 
the aid of the legal means applied and applicable and reveal the laws mani­
festing themselves in the interaction of these means; secondly, to study the 
forms of regulation and systematization born in the laws of notion of the 
historical and logical elements (cca. about things this study deals with); 
thirdly, for practical purposes ans also scientifically a general survey has 
to be offered in a rational system of (1) the subjects of this domain of law, 
their legal statics and potential capabilities; (2) the dynamic system of 
means of their operation and cooperation; further (3) the method of the 
settlement of any disputes which may emerge. This is largely the general 
part of the discipline, to be followed by the detailed ans systematic study 
of the particular institutions of law.
As regards the potential and natural differentiation of the discipline, 
this is in the present connexion as natural and reasonable as it was from the 
normative aspects of the law of international economic relations.
I
2. Principal content elements of the subject-matter of the 
’law of international economic relations’
Under the following headings, so to say tentatively for the demonstra­
tion what has been brought forward theoretically, an attempt will be made 
at outlining the principal elements of the system. The complete expoisi- 
tion of the subject will be the task of further efforts.
The sources are the most significant elements of the content irrespecti­
ve of whet her t hey are of a binding force, or if so, to what extent, or whether 
they obtain this binding force only through a contract. The brief survey 
of the sources classified by their origin indicates that this in its content 
coherent complex corpus of law according to its form bearing the criteria 
of several branches of law, is in reality a huge totality of provisions of law.
(a) Part of the norms of internal origin are the rules giving expression, 
and developing the foreign trade monopoly direclty (the organization of 
foreign trade, administrative competencies of superior authorities, foreign 
trade administration, planning and guiding of foreign frade, foreign ex­
change law, right to foreign trade transactions, import and export licences, 
customs and other means for the control of foreign trade transactions). Ot-
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her internal norms are: the norms of inland economic activities of aliens 
(investments, mixed enterprises, representations) and the ot her way round: 
the norms of international cooperation, and specialization: the substantive 
rules of the law of obligations the municipal conflict rules of foreign trade 
relations; the municipal rules or arbitration.
(b) Owing to the membership or participation of Hungary on the uni­
versal or multilateral legal structures of international origin the following 
are effective in, or relevant for, Hungary: (aa) the following sources of law 
of major importance apply to tlie political or concrete economic attitude 
of the states: the sections of the Charter of the United Nations Organization 
on the economic rights and obligations of the states: the sections on econ­
omic policv of the Final Acts of the Helsinki European Security Conference; 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): the resolutions of the 
XJN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): agreements bring­
ing under reulation international investments such as the Adria oil pipeline 
construction, or the provisions of inter-state cartels such as the internat­
ional tin convention: (bb) Regulations overwhelmingly issued to economic- 
units: the various conventions on transport and affreightment; the liability 
for atomic damages: the convention on uniform rules of international sales 
(UL1S); the Régies and Reglement summing up the uniform substantive 
provisions governing letters of credit and collections published in the pri­
vate codification- of the International Chamber of Commerce, to which the 
competent Hungarian banks have also subscribed; INCO-TERMS, in like 
way a ‘private codification1 of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and certain uniform substantive provisions of international commercial 
agreements, such as those governing the site of performance, costs and 
charges, etc.: the international convention on cheques and bills; the general 
conditions of the European Economic Commission and the vasios rules of 
arbitration etc. (<•) Of the international rules of bilateral origin (aa) over­
whelmingly binding the states the more important ones are: commercial 
and consular agreements, conventions and minutes on the b: I at osai trade 
turnover, conventions on judicial assistance, agreements on joint invest­
ments or the agreements on the creation of economic organizations, (bb) 
The parts and sections of the commercial and consular agreements and of 
the agreements on judicial assistance relating to the legal status of economic 
units.
(d) The great unity of rules giving expression to the economic integ­
ration of the CMEA countries, bringing under regulation and developing 
this integration as for their subject-matter appear on at least three mutually 
overlapping and conditioning planes: (aa) The one plane is that of organ­
ization and decision-making in general. Historically and logically the norms 
on this plane are the premisses of the corpus of rules carried by the follow­
ing two planes, (bb) The second plane is that of the joint institutions and 
other rights or obligations of the member states taking part in the integra­
tion (joint inter-state economic organizations, joint banks, clearing system, 
coordination of the economic plan, prognostications, agreements on special­
ization, investments, agreements of the agencies of economic management
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state liability for economic undertakings, arbitration, etc.), (cc) The third 
plane is that of the norms bringing under regulation the legal relations of 
the enterprises the general conditions of sales, installation, technical serv­
ices, agreements on affreightment, the norms of joint economic organ­
izations, rules governing the transfer of intellectual property,supplemen­
tary conflicht rules, etc.).
Like in other branches ol law the general principles, the principles of the 
law of internaional economic relations discharge the two principal funct 
ions of principles, viz. first, they provide the general background of the 
given domain of law. secondly, they, provide the general framework of the 
content unfolded in the part provisions, and as such are the source of their 
h it ci pi et at i\e-development al practical application. These principles do 
not live exclusively in general political theses, but put on the form of the in 
statutory formulation binding norms. This review complied with no claim 
to completeness makes it clear that here we have an in weight and number 
legally concretized significant phenomanon.
(a) High ranking provisions of law formulate the principles of munic­
ipal origin. On this understanding the most general source of law is the Hun- 
garian Foreign Trade Act of 1974. This act lends a statutory form and 
force to principles such as sovereingty. the respect for international 
commitments, the equality of rights, the guarantee of mutual benefits and 
refrain from discrimination in the international economic relations, part - 
icipation in the international division of labour and in the socilist econo­
mic integration, the state monopoly and state planning of foreign trade 
The Foreign Exchange Code of 1 »74 declares and regulates in detail the 
state monopoly of foreign exchange policy.
(b) Certain general international conventions of special significance 
and effective in Hungary particularly abound in the formation of the princ­
iples of international economic relations to theses of law. The significance 
of these theses is patent even when part of t hem moves within the generaliti­
es of the formulation of a programme. The UN Charter on the economic 
rights and obligations of the states (1974) is a wealthy storehouse of such 
theses. They range from the principles of state sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and equality of the states to such as the mutual benefits, the bona 
fide performance of international obligations, the abstention from end- 
evours for economic hegemony, the sovereign rights of the states in respect 
ol national assets and resources, the right of the regulation of foreign trade 
relations and foreign investments in agreement with the interests of the 
state, the sovereign right of the states of nationalization and the recognit­
ion of the domestic order of compensation, the right and obligation of 
participation in the international division of labour, the prohibition of 
discrimination, the promotion of the international turnover in goods and 
so also that of world trade by respecting the specific interests of the devel­
oping countries, the promotion of general and intensive regional economic 
cooperation, etc.
A large number of these principles has been presented in a ’European" 
framework of the Final Act of the European Conference of Security and
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Coopération of 1975. The conference itself lias accorded a prominent role 
to economic, scientific and technological cooperation. Among the theses 
of the conference special mention may be made of the one laying stress 
on the most-favoured-nations clause (i. e. the clause guaranteeing uniform 
commercial terms to all foreign partners or partner enterprises of the parti­
cular country; under the clause no preferenctial treatment can be granted 
to the enterprises of the one country to the prejudice of the other, the bene­
fit granted to the one must accordingly be granted also to the other country), 
bv stimulating the recourse to the many-sided aids of the international 
movement of goods the protection of the home markets against possible 
market-destructing merchandise dumping or similar contingencies, the 
support of the large-scale international activities of small- and medium- 
size enterprises, the development of legislation advancing the growth of 
international trade and the extension of the relevant information service, 
the reinforcement of the new forms of inter-enterprisal cooperation going 
beyond the traditional trade, the use of expeditious forms of arbitration 
for the determination of disputes, etc.
The GATT is yet a further general convention of which Hungary is a 
member since 1973, and which for the purpose of the legal order of foreign 
trade relations incorpoerates significant concrete principles. Among these 
principles there are three which in a concrete manner affect Hungary's 
foreign trade, its legal regulation (modified in agreement with the conven­
tion at the time of its being joined) to an extent that the instrument of 
accession itself is but the detailed exposition of the manner how the prin­
ciples of GATT will be enforced. The GATT principles are (the classical 
GATT rights and obligations): the most-favoured nations-clause, the 
reduction of protectionist measures, abstention from dumping activities 
and the recognition of the right to take defensive action against them.
(r) We have yet to speak of the principles of the Complex Programme 
(1971). an instrument formulating the principles of economic integration 
of the socialist world. In addition to the principles of a more or less general 
character, such as in the development of the many-sided cooperation to an 
economic integration 'in agreement with the principles of socialist interna­
tionalism the respect for state sovereignty, independence and the national 
interests, the non-interference in the domestic affairs of the countries, the 
complete equality of rights, (the principle) of mutual advantages and mu­
tual comradely assistance' (Complex Programme, chap. 1(2) we may speci­
ally mention the principles operating towards a working system of regula­
tion, such as the principles of voluntariness and interestedness in the parti­
cular concrete forms of cooperation, the openness towards the outer world, 
the gradual approximation of the standards of development of the member 
states, by the side of the plan documentation and prognistieation the ex­
ploitation of the merchandise and money relations within a wide sphere, 
by the side of the development of the forms of interstate cooperation the 
development of the inter-enterprisal level (joint enterprises, economic and 
coordinating agencies, specialization and cooperation), the improvement 
of the legal foundations of cooperation, among others the normative re-
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inforcement of the principles of economic liability of the states for the per­
formance of their economic undertakings.
The next great unity of the principal elements embraced by the princ­
iples and the sources of law is provided by the subjec s of the international 
economic relations, or more explicitly the state and inter-state agencies 
guiding and realizing the international economic relations, and by the enter­
prises and juristic persons operating in this field.
(a) The organization and rights of the state and inter-state agencies 
are neither in general nor sui generis parts of the law of international eco­
nomic relations whose main drift consists of the flow of goods, technologies, 
services, cooperations of different levels, investments, payments and labour 
between the enterprises translated into reality in the controls of a civli 
law nature. Yet first the state level too may appear on these waters, and, 
secondly, and this is decisive, the controlling* system of public law nature is 
the condition and organic element of the transactions of the civil law level, 
and of the shape they take. Therefore the reasonable reflexion of reality and 
the complex approac insist that the law of international economic relations 
from this specific outlook embraces the elements of the public law level 
projected so the plane of the law of international economic relations and 
of relevance only there.
(aa) Here obviously above all the domestic agencies of state guidance 
of foreign trade and their rights are of primary importance. In a simplified 
form the statement may be made that this implies all that the state mono­
poly of foreign trade purports. This monopoly is embodied decisively by 
the rights of the Ministry of Foreign Trade as transmitted to it from the 
legislature through the Council of Ministers and the other departments 
and other all-national authorities, rights such as, in the wider sense of the 
term, the planning of foreign trade as implied in the totality of national 
planning; the definition of the direct and indirect systems of assets required 
for the execution of the plans; the development and realization of the gene­
ral and concrete measures for the participation in international division of 
labour, in particular in the CMEA cooperation; participation in the opera­
tions of the international agencies serving this purpose and in internatio­
nal legislation; the establishment of the regulations governing the organ­
ization system of foreign trade, its operation, guidance and control; the es­
tablishment and enforcement of foreign trade policy; the establishment of 
a system of granting foreign trading rights and foreign trade licences; regu­
lation of economic activities pursued by foreigners in Hungary; establish­
ment of a foreign exchange policy and the regulation of participation in 
international financial cooperation.
(bb) After this survey a few words will have to be said of the general 
international organizations and institutions with effects on Hungarian for­
eign trade relations, hereineluded also on developments at the civil law 
level. As is commonly known the normative effects of these organizations 
and institutions are due to the circumstance that Hungary has a part in 
them either as member or in any other capacity. Organizations of this kind
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are tlie United Nationa Organizations which in its Cheater on the econ­
omic rights and obligations of the states defines a number of normatives 
relating to foreign trade. There is further the Economic Commission, 
for Europe, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the UN Committe of International Crade law (UNCITRAL), 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Saw (UNID­
ROIT), the International Law Association (ILA), the International Cham­
ber of Commerce (ICC), etc. The Economic Commission for Europe and 
UNIDROIT, further the International Chamber of Commerce, have com­
plied a number of instruments, draft agreements and conventions, furt her 
several general conditions for international contracts, which owing to their 
wide circulation have a considerable influence on the contract-making 
practice also of the Hungarian foreign trade enterprises. On the one side 
they have an influence on the substantive contents of the contracts (so e. 
g. the general conditions of the ECE or the sales unsances as formulated by 
the ICC, the INCOTERMS). The condtions and conventions as formulated 
by these organizations directly and formally define therulesof internation­
al financial transactions of the enterprises (such as letters of credit and 
collections of funds as governed by the ICC usances, the Règles and the 
Reglement). These are elements of the phenomenon which, as has been 
made clear above, literature has formulated as the autonomous law of in­
ternational trade, as the modern lex merratoria. Still the act ivities of these 
agencies influence the development of the system of civil law institutions 
in many other respects. The addressees of the resolutions of UNCTAD are 
the states rather than the enterprises, still even so these regulations may 
have an effect on the contracts made by the enterprises. A generally accept­
ed UNCTAD normative is e. g. that the preferential customs duties grant­
ed to the developing countries may amount to an exception from under 
the GATT rule of the most-preferred nation's clause, i. e. no other country 
mav bring forward claims to preferential tariffs on the plea of the most­
favoured-nation's clause. This policy of preferential tariffs lends a greater 
impetus to the developing countries and among others, also to the turnover 
under contracts of Hungarian enterprises. What is essent ial here is that the 
Hungarian commercial customs tariffs have also been adjusted to the prin­
ciple proclaimed by UNCTAD.
Among the general internationl institutions mention should be made 
of the role of GATT, by which it influences the development of Hungarian 
foreign trade. This sphere also includes the activities of the Hague Confe­
rence in the field of codification, so e. g. in the unification of the substan­
tive law of international sales UL1S, 1964), or the International Tin Con­
vention (interstate tin cartel), which has been joined by Hungary in 1970. 
and which in a concrete form and strongly influences the conditions of 
production, distribution, market organization and supply and demand on 
which Hungarian enterprises may sign international trading agreements 
for these products.
Although the European Economic Community, the European Free 
Trade Association, the Northern Council, etc. are organizations of a region-
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al and capitalist character, and not such of a general character, still a 
Hungarian legal science work of the law of international economic relations 
may have to touch on them briefly. In their effects these institutions and 
associations namely influence the system of legal terms of Hungarian fo­
reign trade, not to mention that Hungarian trade with the capitalist world 
is overwhelmingly transactid with the of the EEC and EFTA regions. 
These organizations and institutions seriously influence Hungarian bilat­
eral international commercial agreements, and within the scope of them a 
number of branches of export trade. And the effect of the extraterritorial 
validity of the law of competition of the EEC on the export or cooperative 
transactions of Hungarian enterprises are also considesable.
(cc) The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is politi­
cally, economically and legally equally the most prominent interstate 
institution which has a decisive influence on Hungary's foreign trade rela­
tions and their order. For the law of international economic relations as a 
matter of course the CMEA provisions directly regulating the economic 
transactions are the most relevant, provisions, namely, of which we have 
to speak on discussing enterprises and their contracts, such as the model 
statutes and uniform provisions relating to the international economic or­
ganizations, the General Conditions of Delivery of Goods and associated 
provisions, the agreement on arbitration, etc. Still in a discussion of the law 
of international economic relations we cannot omit speaking to a certain 
extent of the legally formulated forms and institutions which define the 
comprehensive strategy of the economic integration of the CMEA (coord­
ination of plans, prognostications, joint investments, etc.), further of the 
decision-making legal acts by the application of which the managing agen­
cies of the CMEA and its permanent committees bring into being the con­
ditions for inter-enterprisal and other concrete economic operations.
(h) After what has been written theoretically of the law of international 
economic relations it stands to reason that the enterprises (legal entities) 
establishing the international economic relations will insist on a comprehens­
ive discussion going into the depths of dogmatics in the system of this 
complex domain of law, and by this also on a prominent position. It is bey­
ond argument that such a discussion will have to extend to all that is of 
interest. An exemplificative enumeration of the principal institutions of the 
corpus of law coming within this scope will include the domestic enterpri­
ses (foreign trade enterprises, industrial enterprises vested with the right 
of foreign trading, mixed Hungariad and foreign enterprises, foreign enter­
prises) together with their legal peculiarities of the nature of foreign trade, 
the law of the international economic organizations created or to be creat­
ed within the scope of- the CMEA, further the legal status of foreign enter­
prises in Hungary.
From the point of view of the required intensity of the legal regulation 
and discussion the contracts constitute the pernaps largest part of the law 
of international economic relations. What is meant here are the contracts 
made by the agencies referred to above by recourse to the systems of means- 
offered by the principles and the sources of law here outlined.
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(a) Even when we confine ourselves to the civil law types of contracts, 
to the corpus of law as understood in the sense set forth above and embrac­
ing the modern lex mercatoria, the list would be an extremely long one. Wit­
hin this scope, after the general problems of foreign trade contracts, then 
appear, so to say emanating from the sources of law of municipal and inter­
national origin and with due consideration to practice and the norms of 
private international law, the contracts of sale, locatio conductio operiš, 
of investment, of cooperation and specialization, for the exploitation of 
intellectual property, of transport and affreightment, commission (agency 
contracts), etc. Yet within this scope we may find the large portion of the 
corpus of law of domestic contracts with a foreign trade object. This is the 
case not only because such contracts stand for the one side of the foreign 
trade transaction as a whole, but also on the plea of the systematizing crite­
rion that the regulation of these contracts takes place in the sign of the 
assumption not only of a domestic element but also of such of a foreign 
trade (economic and legal) element.
(b) I t  is easy to admit the affiliation of the category of contracts as 
detailed above to the law of international economic relations. According 
to the concept of the law of international economic relations, however, 
this category of contracts, or quasi-contractual conventions includes also 
those which the state signs either on a bilateral basis (interstate commercial 
agreements, barter agreements, minutes, etc.), or in the form of multila­
teral CMEA-recommendations or other conventions. These namely define 
most directly Hungary's foreign trade policy, and these are the conventions 
within the framework of which the civil law system of contracts may move. 
Often these are the conventions from which the civillaw contracts are di­
rectly forthcoming (see. e. g. the interstate contract on the Orenburg gas 
pipeline, to which from the formation of domestic enterprises onwards a 
set of other contracts embodying the international undertaking of obliga­
tions is attached).
Complexity insists that the contracts deal with the state-authoritative 
means, or those of indirect influence by which the state is intent to direct 
the foreign trade contracts of the enterprises in the one or the other sense. 
These means in all cases move together with the contracts, they are their 
outer envelope in which also the marshalling role of the state in foreign 
trade manifest itself. This sphere incorporates the licensing system of 
contracts, customs, credits or any other means encouraging or discourag­
ing dontract-making of the entosprises.
The movement of commodities, services or other assets is but the 
one side only of the law of international economic relations. This movement 
is in all cases accompanied by that of the consideratin terms of money. 
The condensed corpus of law of this latter movement is what may be de­
signates as the law of paymeants in international economic relations, and 
also discussed under this heading. In addition to problems of the law of 
banking transactions and payments it is here where issues of institutions 
appear such as those of the principal elements of currency law, the commer­
cial forms of payments (cheques, bills, letters of credit, collection, etc.)
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the order of panvments in CMEA cooperation, the role of joint banks and 
the multinational clearing applied also inder the General Conditions of 
Delivery of Goods.
The provisions governing the seulement of legal disputes constitute so 
to say the closing chapter of the law of international economic relations, 
and so also of a veritable business transaction whenever some sort of an 
irregularity arises in it. The unity of the real processes, the demand of com­
plexity, moreover also tradition (that namely international civil procedure 
was once embraced by the traditional systems of private international 
law) all tend to confirm that this corpus of law should have its place in 
the law of international economic relations. Here the case is not one sim­
ply of arbitration as current in foreign trade or arbitration as adopted bv 
the CMEA, or of ordinary legal procedure in certain cases, or the body of 
law of the enforcement of judgements, and its integration into the system, 
and not even ontly one of jurisdictions in the conventional meaning of 
the term. It is the case of all these and yet something else. Namely it is 
the case of the economic-financial liability of the states for their substantive 
undertakings, by the side of the general problems of which slowly the CMEA 
legislation purposing the legal institutionalization of this form of liability 
begins to unfold itself. In this connexion a study has to be made of the 
issue of immunity, or more explicitly of the norms which indicate that the 
development of socialist law points in direction of relative immunity, or 
in other words, that when in the sphere of civil law trancastions the state 
divests itself of the toga of sovereignty, something that is of everyday 
occurrence in the modern world, then it more and more recognizes also 
the consequences of this in liability and jurisdiction.
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R S СЯ Г DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSBEZIEHUNGEN 
Prof. F . MÄDL
Die immer stärkere In ternationalisierung der W irtschaftsprozesse (der technologi­
schen E ntw icklung, der P roduktion  und des Handles) h a t eine juristische S truk tu r bew irkt, 
die über traditionelle Form en hinaus von langfristigen K ooperationsverträge bis zu dem 
juristischen Gebilde der w irtschaftlichen In tegration  fü h rt, und  im R ham en des traditionel­
len in ternationalen  P rivatrech ts oder anderen eng aufgefassten Rechtszweigen nich t mehr 
entsprechend erfasst, bzw. gefördert werden kann. Aus dieser S ituation  ausgehend wird in 
dem A ufsatz de Versuch unternomm en: un ter der Bezeichnung „R ech t der In ternationalen  
W irtschaftsbeziehungen“ die R ahm en einen ra la tiv  selbständigen kom plexen Rechtsgebie­
tes u n d  die prinzipiellen F ragen  einer Disziplin gleichen N am ens zu umreissen.
ПРАВО МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ СВЯЗЕЙ
Ф. МАДЛ 
проф.
Научная работа анализирует изменения мировой экономики, формы .между­
народных экономических связей, которые не входят в традиционное понятие между­
народного частного права, выходили за его пределы, а также выходили за пределы 
и других отраслей права: в противоположность твёрдому разграничению отрасле­
вого права принесли факт и действительность комплексного урегулирования. Исходя 
из этого положения, под наименованием «право международны экономических 
связей», автор делает попытку включить комплексный правовой материал между­
народных экономических связей в релаеивно отдельную связаную систему, точнее он 
обрисовает пределы этой системы и очеривает более важные задачи относящейся к 
этому дисциплины.
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